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CAUSE NO.

D.M.,

Plaintiff,

v.

M.A.J.O.,

Fast and Easy Inc.

Defendants.

In the District Court

Harris County, Texas

_____ Judicial District

Plaintiff's Original Petition

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, D.M. (“Plaintiff”) and files her Original Petition against M.A.J.O. and Fast and Easy Inc., (collectively, “Defendants”) and in support thereof, respectfully shows unto the Court as follows:

I. Discovery Control Plan

1.Pursuant to Rules 190.1 and 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff files this Original Petition under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan.

1This suit is not governed by the expedited actions process in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 169 because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in excess of $250,000. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 169(b).

II. Parties

2.Plaintiff, D.M., is an individual residing in Harris County, Texas.

3.Defendant, M.A.J.O., is an individual residing in Houston, Texas. M.A.J.O. may be served with process at his residence at , Houston, Texas, or wherever he may be found.

4.Defendant, Fast and Easy Inc. (“Fast and Easy”), is a domestic for-profit corporation organized under the laws of and doing business in the State of Texas. Fast and Easy has its principal office located at , Houston, Texas. It may be served with process through its registered agent, , at , Houston, Texas.

III. Jurisdiction and Venue

5.The Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this lawsuit, and the amount in controversy is above the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Honorable Court as Plaintiff seeks aggregate monetary relief in excess of $1,000,000.00. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 47. Additionally, removal to federal court would be improper because this lawsuit does not involve a federal question, this lawsuit lacks diversity because M.A.J.O. is a Texas citizen, and/or because of the forum defendant rule.

6.The Court has jurisdiction over Defendants as M.A.J.O. is a resident and citizen of the State of Texas and Fast and Easy transacts business continuously and systematically within the State of Texas. Additionally, pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.005, venue proper to one defendant is proper to all defendants.

7.This is a personal injury suit resulting from a motor vehicle collision that occurred in Harris County, Texas. Thus, pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.002(a)(1), Harris County is the proper venue because it is the county where all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

IV. Facts

8.Around 7:45 a.m. on March 2, 2026, Plaintiff D.M. was driving southeast on U.S. Route 290 by car. As she approached the interchange to merge onto Katy Freeway (I-10) towards downtown Houston, Plaintiff carefully and lawfully entered an appropriate lane with traffic merging onto I-10. Plaintiff then properly and safely proceeded in her lane behind a pickup truck with attached trailer, independent to this suit, that entered into the same lane directly in front of her. Meanwhile, Defendant M.A.J.O. was driving an 18-wheeler commercial motor vehicle and trailer that was owned and operated by Defendant Fast and Easy Inc. along the same stretch of U.S. Route 290. M.A.J.O., who was at that point in the adjacent left lane to Plaintiff, abruptly entered into Plaintiff’s lane colliding into Plaintiff’s vehicle in an apparent attempt to similarly merge onto I-10 East.

9.As a result of the crash, Plaintiff D.M.’s body was thrust into the driver’s door of the vehicle, which caused her physical injuries, including, but not limited to, blunt force head trauma and reflex incontinence.

10.Defendant Fast and Easy is an interstate freight carrier with both USDOT and TXDOT numbers assigned to it. Based upon information and belief, Fast and Easy owned the trailer that M.A.J.O. was hauling and the commercial motor vehicle that M.A.J.O. was operating at the time of his collision with Plaintiff.

11.At all times material, M.A.J.O. was acting within the course and scope of his duties and employment with Fast and Easy.

12.Defendants’ negligence proximately caused the collision resulting in the traumatic physical injury to Plaintiff and accompanying property damage to her lawfully driven vehicle.

13.This suit is brought in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas for the recovery of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants herein. Plaintiff will show that the incident occurred and was proximately caused by the negligence, direct and vicarious, of Defendants M.A.J.O. and Fast and Easy Inc. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend and/or supplement this petition as facts, discovery, and circumstances may dictate.

V. Causes of Action

14.Paragraphs 1-13 are hereby alleged and incorporated by reference.

Against Defendant M.A.J.O. — (A) Negligence and Negligence Per Se

15.At the time and on the occasion in question, Defendant M.A.J.O. committed acts and omissions, which collectively and separately constituted negligence. Defendant M.A.J.O. had a duty to exercise ordinary care, meaning such degree of care that would be used by any individual of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

16.M.A.J.O. breached that duty in one or more of the following, non-exclusive ways: (a) In failing to operate the commercial motor vehicle in obedience with traffic laws and regulations; (b) In failing to operate the commercial motor vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner for the road, load, and traffic conditions; (c) In failing to maintain a proper and/or safe lookout; (d) In failing to maintain a single lane, in violation of Tex. Trans. Code § 545.060; (e) In making an unsafe lane change; (f) In failing to yield the right of way; (g) In failing to pay attention to the conditions of the road and/or traffic; (h) In driving the commercial motor vehicle in a manner that was unsafe for the conditions present on the roadway; (i) In driving the commercial motor vehicle in a manner that was unsafe for the conditions present on the roadway; (j) In driving the commercial motor vehicle in a reckless, careless, unsafe, and/or hazardous manner; and (k) In driving the vehicle in willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons, in violation of Tex. Trans. Code § 545.401.

17.Such negligence, either singularly or in combination, proximately caused the injuries and damages to Plaintiff D.M.

Against Defendant M.A.J.O. — (B) Gross Negligence

18.Defendant M.A.J.O.’s acts and omissions, as previously described, were committed with complete and reckless disregard for, and with willful, wanton, and actual conscious indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of Plaintiff and the general public. The nature of M.A.J.O.’s acts and omissions were of such a nature as to constitute gross negligence and malice.

19.When viewed objectively from the standpoint of Defendant M.A.J.O. at the time of their occurrence, said acts and omissions conscious decisions involved an extreme degree of physical risk and danger, considering the probability and magnitude of potential harm to others. Such was done with subjective knowledge and awareness of the risks and hazards to expose Plaintiff and others on the roadway to life-threatening hazards. This gross negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence and Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.

Against Defendant Fast and Easy Inc. — (A) Vicarious Liability

20.Plaintiff affirmatively pleads that any alleged acts or negligence of Defendant M.A.J.O. were committed while he was acting in the course and scope of his duties and employment with Defendant Fast and Easy Inc., and in the furtherance of Fast and Easy’s business, and are thus imputed to Fast and Easy under a legal theory of respondeat superior. Accordingly, Defendant Fast and Easy is vicariously liable for the negligence of Defendant M.A.J.O.

Against Defendant Fast and Easy Inc. — (B) Negligence and Negligence Per Se

21.Defendant Fast and Easy is directly and independently liable to Plaintiff for negligent acts and omissions as committed by it and its agents, employees, servants, and representatives, which collectively and separately constituted negligence. Defendant Fast and Easy owed duties to Plaintiff and to the users of the public roads and highways, including as created by common law, statutory law, regulatory law, rules, and regulations.

22.Fast and Easy breached its duties in one or more of the following, non-exclusive ways: (a) In failing to exercise ordinary care in the screening, interviewing, vetting, qualification assessment, and hiring of Defendant M.A.J.O. as a driver and operator of a commercial motor vehicle; (b) In failing to comply with the applicable state laws as well as the rules and regulations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration in the hiring and qualification assessment of Defendant M.A.J.O.; (c) In hiring an unfit, incompetent, or reckless driver whom Fast and Easy knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, to be unfit, incompetent, or reckless, thereby creating an unreasonable risk of harm; (d) In retaining an unfit, incompetent, or reckless driver whom Fast and Easy knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, to be unfit, incompetent, or reckless, thereby creating an unreasonable risk of harm; (e) In entrusting and permitting an unfit, incompetent, or reckless driver whom Fast and Easy knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, to be unfit, incompetent, or reckless, to operate a commercial motor vehicle; (f) In failing to properly train Defendant M.A.J.O., including, but not limited to training, M.A.J.O. to be a safe, careful, and prudent driver of a commercial motor vehicle; (g) In failing to properly monitor and supervise the commercial vehicular activities of Defendant M.A.J.O.; (h) In failing to prevent Defendant M.A.J.O. from operating a commercial motor vehicle at a time or under circumstances where M.A.J.O. was physically and/or mentally unable to drive and operate a commercial motor vehicle safely; and (i) In failing to comply with the applicable state laws as well as the rules and regulations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration in the training, monitoring, and supervision of Defendant M.A.J.O. as a driver and operator of a commercial motor vehicle.

23.Such negligence, either singularly or in combination, proximately caused the injuries and damages to Plaintiff D.M.

Against Defendant Fast and Easy Inc. — (C) Gross Negligence

24.All acts, conduct, and omissions on the part of Defendant Fast and Easy, either singularly or in combination, further constitutes gross negligence. Fast and Easy’s acts and omissions, as previously described, were committed with complete and reckless disregard for, and with willful, wanton, and actual conscious indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of Plaintiff and the general public.

25.When viewed objectively from the standpoint of Defendant Fast and Easy at the time of their occurrence, said acts and omissions conscious decisions involved an extreme degree of physical risk and danger, considering the probability and magnitude of potential harm to others. Such was done with subjective knowledge and awareness of the risks and hazards to expose Plaintiff and others on the roadway to life-threatening hazards. This gross negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence and Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.

VI. Damages

26.As a result of Defendants’ actions and/or inactions, Plaintiff brings this lawsuit for the following damages: (a) Past and future physical pain, impairment, and suffering; (b) Past and future mental anguish; (c) Past and future medical and other healthcare-related expenses; (d) Past and future lost wages and loss of earning capacity; (e) Past and future loss of enjoyment of life; (f) Punitive and exemplary damages; and (g) Any and all other damages, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.

27.Plaintiff also seeks all interest, including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as permitted by law, as well as all court costs and fees associated with this lawsuit. See Tex. Fin. Code § 304.104.

VII. Preservation of Evidence

28.Plaintiff hereby requests and demands that Defendants and their agents, attorneys, and insurers preserve and maintain all evidence pertaining to any claim or defense to the incident made the basis of this lawsuit, or the damages resulting therefrom, including, but not limited to, photographs, videos, audio recordings, business records, memoranda, files, facsimiles, e-mails, voicemails, text or telephone messages, telephone calling card transactions, sales receipts, invoices, commission records, tax records, calendar entries, incident reports, and any electronic data or information related to the incident forming the basis of this lawsuit. Failure to maintain such items, including, but not limited to, any other items previously requested and demanded to be preserved before the instant lawsuit was filed, will constitute spoliation of evidence and may subject Defendants to sanctioning as appropriately determined by this Court.

VIII. Conditions Precedent

29.Plaintiff would show that all conditions precedent to the maintenance of this action have been met and satisfied.

IX. Reservation of Rights

30.Due to the complex nature of accident and collision, including the implication of the responding police officer’s assertions regarding unfound new state laws and policies impacting documentation of evidence, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this pleading to join and/or omit parties as appropriate and to assert additional or different claims, allegations, causes of action, and grounds for recovery.

X. Self-Authentication

31.Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7, Defendants are hereby put on actual notice that any documents produced in response to written discovery or for inspection at deposition may be used in pretrial proceedings and at trial. Further, all documents produced in this litigation are deemed authentic unless valid objections to authenticity are made by Defendants pursuant to this rule.

XI. Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays to recover such sums as would reasonably and justly compensate her, in accordance with the rules of law and procedure, as to actual damages, exemplary and punitive damages, court costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law, and for any other and further relief, either at law or in equity, to which she may be justly entitled.

Dated: April 10, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

JDA Trials LLC

/s/ Jeffrey D. Anderson

Jeffrey D. Anderson

State Bar No. 24087100

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Redacted public copy prepared by JDA Trials · Allegations are not findings · Not legal advice