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CAUSE NO.

J.L.M.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Greenville NIS, L.L.C. d/b/a Nissan of Greenville a/k/a Greenville Nissan,

D.S.,

Santander Consumer USA Inc.

Defendants.

In the District Court

Hunt County, Texas

_____ Judicial District

Plaintiff's Original Petition, Request for Declaratory Judgment, and Demand for Jury Trial

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW Plaintiff J.L.M. (“Plaintiff” or “J.L.M.”) and files this his Original Petition complaining of Defendants Greenville NIS, L.L.C. d/b/a Nissan of Greenville a/k/a Greenville Nissan (the “Dealership”), D.S. (“D.S.”), and Santander Consumer USA Inc. (“Santander”), and for cause of action would respectfully show the Court as follows:

I. Discovery Control Plan

1.Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Level 2 of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 190.3 and affirmatively pleads that this suit is not governed by the expedited-actions process in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 169 because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in excess of $250,000.00 and also seeks non-monetary declaratory relief.

II. Parties

2.Plaintiff J.L.M. is an individual residing in Harris County, Texas.

3.Defendant Greenville NIS, L.L.C. d/b/a Nissan of Greenville a/k/a Greenville Nissan is a Texas limited liability company doing business in Hunt County, Texas, with its principal place of business at , Greenville, Texas. The Dealership may be served with process through its registered agent, C T Corporation System, at , Dallas, Texas, or wherever it may be found.

4.Defendant D.S. is an individual residing in Texas who, at all times material to this suit, was employed by the Dealership as a manager with responsibility for the financing of Plaintiff's vehicle purchase. D.S. may be served with process at , Greenville, Texas, or wherever he may be found.

5.Defendant Santander Consumer USA Inc. is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Texas, and it regularly conducts business in Texas, including in Hunt County. Santander may be served with process through its registered agent, C T Corporation System, at , Dallas, Texas, or wherever it may be found.

6.The identity of the repossession company and the individual repossession agent who took possession of Plaintiff's vehicle is not presently known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff will amend this Petition to add those parties promptly upon ascertaining their identities through discovery.

III. Jurisdiction and Venue

7.This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the damages sought are within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and because Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief under Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

8.This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant. Each Defendant is a Texas resident, maintains its principal place of business in Texas, or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Texas, and Plaintiff's claims arise from that Texas activity.

9.Venue is proper in Hunt County, Texas under Section 15.002(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in Hunt County, including the sale of the vehicle, the preparation and execution of the disputed retail installment contract, and the assignment of that contract to Santander. Venue is also proper under Section 15.002(a)(3) because the Dealership's principal office in Texas is located in Hunt County, and under Section 17.56 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.

IV. Conditions Precedent and DTPA Notice

10.All conditions precedent to Plaintiff's recovery have been performed, have occurred, or have been waived or excused.

11.Plaintiff affirmatively pleads that the giving of sixty days' pre-suit written notice under Section 17.505(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code was rendered impracticable by reason of the necessity of filing suit in order to prevent the expiration of the statute of limitations, and that such notice is therefore excused under Section 17.505(b).

V. Factual Background

12.On or about July 9, 2024, J.L.M. purchased a new 2024 Nissan Frontier (the “Vehicle”), from the Dealership. The transaction was assigned Dealership deal number and customer number .

13.As part of the transaction, J.L.M. traded in a 2023 Ford Bronco Sport for which he received a trade allowance against an outstanding lien payoff.

14.On July 9, 2024, J.L.M. physically signed — in wet ink, at the Dealership — a Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Contract (the “First Contract”) together with the balance of the deal documents. The First Contract was assigned to Nissan Motor Acceptance Company (“NMAC”). J.L.M. agreed to finance the Vehicle through NMAC and through no other lender.

15.On or about July 11, 2024, D.S. called J.L.M.'s wife and told her that the financing with NMAC had fallen through, that financing had instead been obtained through Santander, and that could sign the new paperwork later, when they came to the Dealership to pick up the registration tags.

16.J.L.M. never returned to the Dealership on July 11, 2024. He never signed a second retail installment contract. He never signed any document electronically in connection with this transaction, and he never authorized any person to affix his signature — electronic or otherwise — to any contract with Santander.

17.Nevertheless, on July 11, 2024, a second Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Contract (the “Second Contract”) was prepared by the Dealership's finance manager. The Second Contract bears an electronic signature purporting to be that of J.L.M. That signature is not J.L.M.'s, and it was not affixed by him or with his consent or effective consent.

18.Also on July 11, 2024, D.S. executed on behalf of the Dealership an Assignment transferring all of the Dealership's right, title, and interest in the Second Contract to Santander Consumer USA Inc.

19.Santander approved and funded the Second Contract. Santander's records reflect a decision dated July 11, 2024, at 11:37 a.m., an amount financed of $47,912.89, a buy rate of 10.93% against a contract rate of 12.93%, dealer participation of $2,500.31, and a total amount disbursed of $50,264.20. The Second Contract obligated J.L.M. to seventy-two monthly payments of $964.80, for a total of payments of $69,465.60.

20.J.L.M. received nothing of value in exchange for the Second Contract. He had already purchased the Vehicle on July 9, 2024. The Dealership and D.S., by contrast, obtained the immediate funding of a deal that NMAC had declined, together with dealer participation of $2,500.31 attributable to the two-percentage-point spread between the buy rate and the contract rate.

21.On August 14, 2024, J.L.M. received an alert through his Allstate identity-protection service notifying him that a new account had been opened in his name. Upon review, the new account was with Santander Consumer USA Inc.

22.That same evening, J.L.M. called Santander and asked how an account had been opened in his name when he had signed no agreement with Santander. At J.L.M.'s request, Santander sent him a copy of the Second Contract in its file. Upon receiving it, J.L.M. immediately recognized that the electronic signature on the document was not his signature because he never issued any electronic signature in connection with this transaction.

23.August 14, 2024 is the date on which J.L.M. first discovered, and the earliest date on which in the exercise of reasonable diligence he could have discovered, the wrongful conduct described in this Petition. Prior to that date, Defendants' conduct was inherently undiscoverable by J.L.M.: the Second Contract was created outside his presence, was never provided to him, and its existence was affirmatively concealed from him by D.S.'s representation that any new paperwork would be signed by J.L.M. at a later date.

24.After receiving the Second Contract, J.L.M. and his wife called the Dealership and spoke with D.S. D.S. stated that had signed an electronic form and that the Dealership had “just simply switched the financing company.” When confronted with the fact that J.L.M. had signed nothing electronically, D.S. stated that he could “undo the deal” and asked, “what do you want from me?”

25.J.L.M. contacted the Greenville, Texas Police Department, and an officer took a report but advised that the matter would be treated as civil rather than criminal.

26.On or about December 3, 2024, J.L.M. filed a written complaint against the Dealership with the Texas Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner (“OCCC”), which was assigned complaint number .

27.In its response to the OCCC, the Dealership admitted that a second contract was prepared by its finance manager on July 11, 2024, and assigned to Santander; that the first contract bore wet signatures while the second bore electronic signatures; and, critically, that the Dealership has no record of J.L.M. returning to the Dealership on July 11, 2024, to sign the second retail installment contract.

28.By letter dated February 21, 2025, the OCCC advised J.L.M. that it had reviewed both contracts, confirmed that the first contained a wet signature and the second an electronic signature, and was unable to determine who signed the second contract. The OCCC recommended that J.L.M. contact a private attorney.

29.On or about March 4, 2025, Santander opened an identity-theft claim concerning the account. On or about March 13, 2025, J.L.M. executed and returned to Santander a notarized Identity Theft Victim Report in which he declared under penalty that he did not authorize any person to use his personal identifying information to obtain the auto loan.

30.Following this fiasco, an agent acting for or at the direction of one or more Defendants came to J.L.M.'s residence and took possession of the Vehicle from his driveway as J.L.M. was arriving home and carrying items inside.

31.J.L.M. was present, confronted the repossession agent, and expressly told the agent to stop. The agent refused to stop, stated that J.L.M. needed to speak with Santander, and continued to take the Vehicle over J.L.M.'s contemporaneous objection.

32.The repossession agent provided J.L.M. no paperwork of any kind at the time of the taking.

33.Plaintiff was never lawfully in default on any enforceable obligation to Santander because J.L.M. never entered into the Second Contract. In taking the Vehicle over J.L.M.'s express and contemporaneous objection, the repossession proceeded without benefit of judicial process or legal authority, in breach of the peace.

34.By letter dated November 3, 2025, Santander notified J.L.M. that it no longer owned or serviced the auto loan and Retail Installment Contract, that it had returned the Second Contract to the Dealership, that all payments received had been forwarded to the Dealership, and that J.L.M. should make no further payments to Santander. The letter reflects an effective date on or about October 21, 2025.

35.As a result of Defendants' conduct, J.L.M. lost the Vehicle, lost the value of his trade-in and payments made, suffered damage to his credit, was subjected to collection activity on an obligation he never incurred, and suffered substantial mental anguish.

VI. Causes of Action

36.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

37.An actual, justiciable controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants concerning the validity and enforceability of the Second Contract and concerning the parties' rights, status, and legal relations under it. Defendants claim rights under the Second Contract, including rights to possess or retain the Vehicle and to collect a deficiency from J.L.M. J.L.M. disputes those claims and contends that he neither signed nor authorized the electronic signature on the Second Contract and never assented to its terms.

38.Under Section 322.009(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, an electronic signature is attributable to a person only if it was the act of that person. The purported electronic signature on the Second Contract is not attributable to J.L.M. because J.L.M. neither accessed nor used the electronic-signature process, did not receive or use any verification code associated with the transaction, and did not authorize any person to execute or accept the Second Contract for him. J.L.M. did not sign, authorize, or assent to the Second Contract. Accordingly, no contract or enforceable security agreement was formed between J.L.M. and Defendants under the Second Contract.

39.Plaintiff requests that the Court declare, pursuant to Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, that: (a) the purported electronic signature on the Second Contract is not attributable to J.L.M. under Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 322.009; (b) J.L.M. did not assent to, and is not bound by, the Second Contract; (c) no enforceable security agreement in the Vehicle arose between J.L.M. and Defendants under the Second Contract; (d) Defendants had and have no contractual or statutory right under the Second Contract to repossess, retain, or assert a security interest in the Vehicle as against J.L.M.; and (e) Defendants have no right to demand, collect, report, or enforce any deficiency against J.L.M. under the Second Contract. Plaintiff further seeks supplemental relief as appropriate under Section 37.008 and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees that are equitable and just under Section 37.009.

40.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

41.Defendant D.S., acting individually and as an agent, servant, and employee of the Dealership within the course and scope of his employment and with the Dealership's actual and apparent authority, made the following material misrepresentations of fact to J.L.M. and his wife: (a) that the retail installment contract they had signed that day was the operative financing agreement, that the only remaining paperwork was ministerial, and that any such paperwork would be signed later, when returned to pick up the registration tags; (b) that new financing paperwork would be signed later when came to pick up the registration tags; and, (c) that J.L.M. had signed an electronic form authorizing the substitution of Santander as the financing source.

42.Each of these representations was false when made. J.L.M. never signed, electronically executed, or otherwise authorized any form permitting the substitution of Santander as the finance source, and no such authorization exists. The Dealership and D.S. knew they were false or made them recklessly without any knowledge of their truth and as positive assertions.

43.Further, and in the alternative, to the extent the representation described in ¶ 41(a) is characterized as a promise of future performance, Defendants made that promise with no intention of performing it at the time it was made. When D.S. told that the remaining paperwork would be signed when they returned for their registration tags, a second retail installment contract naming Santander as assignee had already been prepared, had already been executed with a signature purporting to be J.L.M.'s — which he did not make or authorize — and had already been assigned to Santander. Defendants therefore never intended for J.L.M. to sign any further financing paperwork and made the representation for the purpose of delaying discovery of the substitution.

44.The Dealership and D.S. further failed to disclose material facts they had a duty to disclose. Defendants deliberately concealed from and failed to disclose to J.L.M. the following material facts: (a) that a second retail installment contract had been created in J.L.M.'s name; (b) that the second contract bore a signature purporting to be J.L.M.'s that he neither made nor authorized; (c) that the second contract had been assigned to Santander; (d) that the terms of the second contract differed from those had agreed to; and (e) that the Dealership received dealer participation, finance reserve, or other compensation from Santander in connection with the substituted financing.

45.Defendants had a duty to disclose these facts, having voluntarily undertaken to speak to about the status of their financing and paperwork. Defendants also made representations that were false or misleading when made or that they later learned were false or misleading, and thereby assumed a duty to correct them. Defendants further created the false impression, by silence and by conduct, that the transaction was proceeding under the contract had actually signed.

46.Defendants' failure to disclose was deliberate. Defendants knew each of the concealed facts, knew J.L.M. was unaware of them, and elected not to disclose them.

47.J.L.M. was ignorant of the concealed facts and did not have an equal opportunity to discover them. The second contract, the purported signature, the assignment to Santander, and the Dealership's compensation from Santander were within Defendants' exclusive possession and control, were not reflected in any document given to J.L.M., and were not discoverable by him through reasonable diligence at the time.

48.Defendants concealed and failed to disclose these facts with the intent that J.L.M. act or refrain from acting — specifically, that he take and keep delivery of the vehicle, refrain from investigating the financing, refrain from objecting to or repudiating the substituted contract, and begin making payments to Santander.

49.The representations and omissions were made with the intent that J.L.M. rely on them. J.L.M. justifiably relied on them to his detriment, and they proximately caused injury to him.

50.Defendants made each of the foregoing representations, and concealed each of the foregoing facts, with the intent that J.L.M. rely upon them. J.L.M. actually and justifiably relied on Defendants' representations and on the false impression created by their concealment.

51.Defendants' fraud and fraud by nondisclosure directly and proximately caused J.L.M. injury. J.L.M. seeks actual damages, measured at his election under either the out-of-pocket or benefit-of-the-bargain measure, including the difference between the terms he agreed to and the terms of the substituted contract; payments made under the substituted contract; loss of use; costs incurred in disputing the account; damage to his credit standing and resulting increased cost of credit, together with mental anguish damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs.

52.Defendants' conduct constitutes fraud within the meaning of Section 41.003(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, entitling J.L.M. to exemplary damages. Defendants' conduct was also malicious and was undertaken with actual awareness of the extreme degree of risk it posed to J.L.M.'s rights and financial interests.

53.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

54.Defendant D.S., acting individually and as an agent, servant, and employee of the Dealership within the course and scope of his employment, made the following representations in the course of the Dealership's business and in a transaction in which the Dealership and D.S. each had a monetary interest: (a) that J.L.M. had previously signed or electronically executed a form authorizing the substitution of Santander Consumer USA, Inc. as the finance source on his retail installment contract; (b) that the retail installment contract executed was the operative and only financing agreement governing the transaction; and (c) that the Dealership's records reflected J.L.M.'s authorization for the financing then in place.

55.Each of the foregoing representations concerned a then-existing fact and each was false when made. J.L.M. never signed, electronically executed, or otherwise authorized any form permitting the substitution of Santander as the finance source; the contract executed was not the only financing agreement in the transaction; and the Dealership's records did not reflect any authorization by J.L.M. for the substituted financing.

56.Defendants supplied this false information for the guidance of J.L.M. in a business transaction, specifically, for his guidance in deciding whether to take and retain delivery of the vehicle, whether to treat the transaction as complete, whether to make payments to Santander, and whether to investigate or object to the financing then in place. Defendants knew that J.L.M. was relying on them for accurate information about the status of his financing paperwork and intended for him to do so.

57.Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating this information. Reasonable care would have required Defendants, before representing that J.L.M. had authorized the substitution, to examine the purported electronic authorization, to verify that a signature attributed to J.L.M. had in fact been made or authorized by him, to review the Dealership's own contract and assignment records, and to compare the executed contract in the Dealership's file against the contract had signed. Defendants did none of these things, or performed them so carelessly as to fail to discover that no authorization existed and that a second contract bearing an unauthorized signature had been created and assigned.

58.J.L.M. actually and justifiably relied on Defendants' representations. In reliance, he took and retained delivery of the vehicle; refrained from demanding return of his trade-in and down payment; refrained from rescinding or unwinding the transaction; made payments to Santander; and refrained from timely disputing the account with Santander and the consumer reporting agencies. J.L.M.'s reliance was justifiable: the accuracy of the financing documents and the existence of any electronic authorization were matters peculiarly within Defendants' knowledge and control, Defendants held themselves out as having access to and familiarity with those records, J.L.M. was given no document disclosing the second contract or the assignment, and no fact known to him would have alerted a reasonable purchaser in his position to make further inquiry.

59.Defendants' negligent misrepresentations proximately caused J.L.M. pecuniary loss independent of, and not merely the subject matter of, any contract between the parties. J.L.M. seeks his out-of-pocket damages, including payments made under a contract he did not authorize; the difference between what he paid and the value of what he received; finance charges and fees incurred; costs incurred in investigating and disputing the substituted account; and damages arising from injury to his credit standing, including the increased cost of credit.

60.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

61.J.L.M. is a “consumer” as defined by Section 17.45(4) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code because he sought and acquired goods and services by purchase. The Dealership and D.S. are each a “person” under Section 17.45(3). D.S. is individually liable for his own violations of the Act notwithstanding that he acted as an employee or agent of the Dealership.

62.The Dealership and D.S. engaged in false, misleading, and deceptive acts and practices that J.L.M. relied on to his detriment, including: representing that the transaction conferred or involved rights, remedies, or obligations which it did not have or involve, in violation of Section 17.46(b)(12); causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services, in violation of Section 17.46(b)(3); representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade when they are not, in violation of Section 17.46(b)(7); representing that services have characteristics, uses, or benefits which they do not have, and that a person has a status, affiliation, or connection which he does not, by representing that the financing arranged for J.L.M. carried the terms and finance source reflected in the contract he signed and that J.L.M. had authorized the arrangement actually put in place, in violation of Section 17.46(b)(5); misrepresenting the authority of a salesman, representative, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a consumer transaction, by representing that the terms J.L.M. negotiated and executed were final when Defendants in fact substituted different financing terms and a different finance source without his knowledge or authorization, in violation of Section 17.46(b)(14); and failing to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction, where such failure was intended to induce J.L.M. into a transaction into which he would not have entered had the information been disclosed, in violation of Section 17.46(b)(24).

63.The Dealership and D.S. further engaged in an unconscionable action or course of action within the meaning of Sections 17.45(5) and 17.50(a)(3) by taking advantage of J.L.M.'s lack of knowledge, ability, experience, and capacity to a grossly unfair degree. Defendants possessed exclusive knowledge and control of the transaction documents, the Dealership's contract and assignment records, and the electronic signature system through which the purported authorization was said to have been made. J.L.M. had no access to those systems or records, no training or experience in retail installment financing or dealer assignment practices, and no means of learning that a second contract had been generated in his name. Defendants exploited that disparity by creating and assigning a contract J.L.M. never signed, by telling him that the remaining paperwork was ministerial and would be handled when he returned for his registration tags, and by representing that he had already authorized what he had not, thereby delaying his discovery of the substitution while the transaction became progressively harder to unwind.

64.Each of the foregoing was a producing cause of economic damages and mental anguish damages to J.L.M. Because the conduct was committed knowingly and intentionally, Plaintiff seeks additional damages under Section 17.50(b)(1), together with attorney's fees and costs under Section 17.50(d).

65.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

66.Section 521.051(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code provides that a person may not obtain, possess, transfer, or use the personal identifying information of another person without the other person's consent and with intent to obtain a good, a service, insurance, an extension of credit, or any other thing of value in the other person's name. Section 521.002(a)(1) defines “personal identifying information” to include information that alone or in conjunction with other information identifies an individual, including that individual's name, date of birth, address, Social Security number, driver's license or other government-issued identification number, and financial account and routing information. Each category of information described below constitutes personal identifying information within the meaning of that section.

67.Defendant D.S., acting individually and as an agent, servant, and employee of the Dealership within the course and scope of his employment, and the Dealership, acting through D.S. and its other officers, employees, and agents, obtained, possessed, transferred, and used J.L.M.'s personal identifying information in violation of Section 521.051(a).

68.The personal identifying information Defendants obtained, possessed, transferred, and used includes J.L.M.'s full legal name; his residential address; his date of birth; his Social Security number; his Texas driver's license number; his employment and income information; and his financial account information. Defendants necessarily transmitted this information to Santander Consumer USA, Inc. in order to procure the extension of credit described below, because an extension of credit of the kind obtained cannot be procured without it. Defendants further affixed to the second retail installment contract a signature purporting to be that of J.L.M., which J.L.M. did not make and did not authorize.

69.Defendants acted without J.L.M.'s consent. Any consent J.L.M. gave was limited in scope to the transaction he authorized and did not extend to the conduct described in this Count.

70.Defendants acted with the intent required by Section 521.051(a). Defendants used J.L.M.'s personal identifying information with the specific intent to obtain, in J.L.M.'s name, an extension of credit from Santander Consumer USA, Inc., and thereby to obtain other things of value, including the proceeds of the assignment of the second retail installment contract and the dealer participation, finance reserve, or other compensation the Dealership received from Santander in connection with that assignment. Defendants' intent is evidenced by, among other things, the fact that the second contract was prepared, executed, and assigned before Defendants told J.L.M. that any further paperwork remained to be signed, and by the fact that Defendants received compensation contingent on the substituted financing.

71.Under Section 521.152, a violation of Section 521.051 is a deceptive trade practice actionable under Subchapter E of Chapter 17. Plaintiff accordingly asserts this claim as a tie-in statute violation and seeks all remedies available under Section 17.50, including additional damages under Section 17.50(b)(1) and (h).

72.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

73.The Dealership and D.S. unlawfully appropriated J.L.M.'s property and unlawfully obtained services within the meaning of Chapter 134 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, including by conduct constituting a violation of Section 32.21 (forgery), Section 32.46 (fraudulent securing of document execution), and Section 32.51 (fraudulent use or possession of identifying information) of the Texas Penal Code, including J.L.M.'s trade-in vehicle, payments made to Santander under a contract he did not authorize, and finance charges and fees imposed under that contract.

74.J.L.M. had a possessory right to the property appropriated and sustained damages as a result. Plaintiff seeks actual damages, statutory damages of up to $1,000.00 under Section 134.005(a)(1), and mandatory attorney's fees and costs under Section 134.005(b).

75.Defendants further committed theft by unlawfully using J.L.M.'s identifying information in violation of Section 32.51 of the Texas Penal Code, as pleaded in Count Five.

76.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

77.Pleaded in the alternative, the First Contract executed on July 9, 2024 is a valid and enforceable contract. J.L.M. performed or tendered performance. The Dealership breached that contract by unilaterally purporting to cancel or replace it and by substituting a materially different financing arrangement without J.L.M.'s assent, proximately causing damages. Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees under Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

78.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

79.Defendants hold money and property belonging in equity and good conscience to J.L.M., including the value of his trade-in, his down payment and monthly payments, and the Vehicle itself. Defendants obtained that benefit by fraud, by taking undue advantage, or under circumstances making retention unjust. Plaintiff seeks restitution and disgorgement.

80.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

81.Santander is a “debt collector” and the amounts it sought to collect are a “consumer debt” within the meaning of Chapter 392 of the Texas Finance Code.

82.Santander violated Chapter 392 by, among other things: threatening to take and taking an action prohibited by law, in violation of Section 392.301(a)(8); collecting or attempting to collect interest, charges, fees, or expenses not expressly authorized by an agreement or legally chargeable to the consumer, in violation of Section 392.303(a)(2); misrepresenting the character, extent, or amount of a consumer debt and its status in a judicial or governmental proceeding, in violation of Section 392.304(a)(8); and using false representations or deceptive means to collect a debt or obtain information concerning a consumer, in violation of Section 392.304(a)(19).

83.Plaintiff seeks actual damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees under Section 392.403, and asserts the tie-in remedies available under Section 392.404(a).

84.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

85.Section 9.609 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code permits a secured party to take possession of collateral after default without judicial process only if it proceeds without breach of the peace.

86.There was no default, because there was no enforceable contract and no valid security interest. Independently, the repossession breached the peace: it was accomplished over J.L.M.'s express, contemporaneous objection communicated directly to the repossession agent at the scene, and the agent refused to desist and completed the taking notwithstanding that objection.

87.Plaintiff seeks damages under Section 9.625(b) and statutory damages under Section 9.625(e), together with all other relief available under Part 6 of Chapter 9.

88.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

89.J.L.M. owned, possessed, and had the immediate right to possess the Vehicle. Defendants wrongfully exercised dominion and control over the Vehicle in a manner inconsistent with J.L.M.'s rights and to the exclusion of those rights. J.L.M. suffered injury as a result.

90.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

91.Pleaded in the alternative, two or more Defendants combined to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means; had a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; committed one or more unlawful, overt acts in furtherance of the object or course of action; and proximately caused damages to J.L.M. Each conspirator is jointly and severally liable for all acts done by any member of the conspiracy in furtherance of it.

92.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.

93.At all material times, D.S. and the Dealership's other personnel acted within the course and scope of their employment with, and with the actual or apparent authority of, the Dealership. The repossession agent acted as the agent of, and at the direction of, the party asserting a security interest in the Vehicle. Each principal is liable for the acts and omissions of its agents, and each subsequently ratified those acts by accepting and retaining their benefits.

VII. Exemplary Damages

94.Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. Defendants' conduct was the result of fraud and malice as those terms are defined in Section 41.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Plaintiff therefore seeks exemplary damages under Chapter 41, separately and individually against each Defendant, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact: (a) D.S. affixed, or caused to be affixed, Plaintiff's electronic signature to the Second Contract and related financing documents without Plaintiff's knowledge, consent, or authorization, knowing the signature to be false, and with intent that Plaintiff act in reliance upon it. (b) The Dealership is liable for exemplary damages by reason of its own conduct and, alternatively, by reason of D.S.'s conduct, in that: (i) the Dealership authorized the doing and the manner of the act; (ii) D.S. was unfit and the Dealership acted with malice in employing or retaining him; (iii) D.S. was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting within the scope of employment; and (iv) the Dealership, or a manager of the Dealership, ratified or approved the act, including by transmitting the documents to Santander, accepting the proceeds, and failing to rescind upon notice. These grounds are pleaded in the alternative and cumulatively. (c) Santander is liable for exemplary damages by reason of its own independent conduct, including directing the repossession without a valid security interest, failing to investigate, and, alternatively, by reason of the conduct of its agents acting within the scope of their authority.

95.Alternatively, Plaintiff's harm resulted from gross negligence, in that the conduct described above, viewed objectively from each Defendant's standpoint at the time it occurred, involved an extreme degree of risk considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to Plaintiff, and each Defendant had actual, subjective awareness of the risk but proceeded with conscious indifference to Plaintiff's rights, safety, or welfare.

96.Plaintiff further pleads that the statutory cap in Section 41.008(b) does not apply to the extent Plaintiff proves conduct described by Section 41.008(c), including conduct constituting forgery under Section 32.21 of the Texas Penal Code, fraudulent securing of document execution under Section 32.46, and fraudulent use or possession of identifying information under Section 32.51. Exemplary damages are in the alternative to, and not in lieu of, any additional, multiplied, or statutory damages sought elsewhere in this Petition. Plaintiff does not elect any remedy at this time and reserves the right to elect the most favorable recovery at judgment.

VIII. Attorney's Fees

97.Plaintiff has retained the undersigned counsel and has agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fees. Plaintiff seeks recovery of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs under Section 17.50(d) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, Section 392.403(b) of the Texas Finance Code, Sections 37.009, 38.001, and 134.005(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and all other applicable authority.

IX. Notice of Self-Authentication

98.Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7, Plaintiff gives notice that he intends to use all documents produced by any Defendant in response to written discovery against the producing party in any pretrial proceeding or at trial.

X. Initial Disclosures

99.Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2, each Defendant is required to serve the initial disclosures described therein within thirty days after the filing of its first answer or general appearance, without awaiting a discovery request.

XI. Demand for Jury Trial

100.Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable and tenders the applicable jury fee contemporaneously with the filing of this Petition.

XII. Rule 47 Statement

101.Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 47(c)(3), Plaintiff states that he seeks monetary relief over $250,000.00 but not more than $1,000,000.00, together with non-monetary declaratory relief, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees, and costs. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this statement as discovery proceeds.

XIII. Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff J.L.M. respectfully prays that Defendants Greenville NIS, L.L.C. d/b/a Nissan of Greenville a/k/a Greenville Nissan, D.S., and Santander Consumer USA Inc. each be cited to appear and answer, and that upon final trial Plaintiff have judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for: (a) a declaratory judgment under Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that the Second Contract is void ab initio and unenforceable against Plaintiff, that any security interest asserted under it is invalid, that the repossession of the Vehicle was wrongful, and that any deficiency claimed under it is void; (b) actual and economic damages in an amount within the jurisdictional limits of this Court, including but not limited to out-of-pocket loss, benefit-of-the-bargain loss, loss of use of the Vehicle, costs of alternative transportation, expenses incurred, and damages for the inability to obtain, or increased costs of, alternative financing under Section 9.625(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code; (c) damages for mental anguish; (d) additional damages under Section 17.50(b)(1) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code; (e) statutory damages under Sections 9.625(b), 9.625(c)(2), and 9.625(e) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and Section 134.005(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; (f) exemplary damages under Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code assessed separately and individually against each Defendant, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact; (g) restitution and disgorgement; (h) injunctive relief, including an order requiring, under Section 392.403(a)(1) of the Texas Finance Code and Section 143.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, each Defendant that has furnished information concerning the Second Contract to any consumer reporting agency to withdraw, delete, and cease reporting that information, and to otherwise correct any credit reporting associated with the Second Contract; (i) reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, both for trial and for any appeal; (j) prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the maximum rates allowed by law; (k) costs of court; and (l) all other relief, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff may show himself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

JDA Trials LLC

/s/ Jeffrey D. Anderson

Jeffrey D. Anderson

State Bar No. 24087100

Attorney for Plaintiff

Redacted public copy prepared by JDA Trials · Allegations are not findings · Not legal advice