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CAUSE NO.

M.A.,

Plaintiff,

v.

J.B. Painting, LLC d/b/a CertaPro Painters of Austin,

J.B.,

B.M.

Defendants.

In the District Court

Travis County, Texas

_____ Judicial District

Plaintiff's Original Petition

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, M.A. (“Plaintiff”) and files his Original Petition against J.B. Painting, LLC d/b/a CertaPro Painters of Austin, J.B., and B.M. (collectively “Defendants”) and in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court as follows:

I. Discovery Control Plan

1.Pursuant to Rule 190.3 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff files this Original Petition under a Level 2 Discovery Control Plan.

II. Parties

2.Plaintiff, M.A., is an individual residing in Travis County, Texas.

3.Defendant, J.B. Painting, LLC d/b/a CertaPro Painters of Austin (“CertaPro”), is a domestic for-profit limited liability company organized and doing business under the laws of the State of Texas. It may be served with process through its registered agent, J.B., at , Austin, Texas.

4.Defendant, J.B., is an individual residing in Austin, Texas. J.B. may be served with process at his residence or business at , Austin, Texas, or wherever he may be found.

5.Defendant, B.M., is an individual residing in Austin, Texas. B.M. may be served with process at his residence at , Lago Vista, Texas, or wherever he may be found.

III. Jurisdiction and Venue

6.This is a personal injury suit resulting from a motor vehicle collision that occurred in Travis County, Texas. Thus, Travis County is the proper venue pursuant to Section 15.002(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code as it is the county where all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

7.The Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this lawsuit as Plaintiff seeks monetary relief over $250,000, but not more than $1,000,000. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 47(c).

8.The Court has jurisdiction over Defendants as CertaPro transacts business continuously and systematically within the State of Texas, and J.B. and B.M. are each residents and citizens of the State of Texas. Further, pursuant to Section 15.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, venue proper to one defendant is proper to all defendants.

IV. Facts

9.On or about July 15, 2025, Plaintiff was lawfully operating a rental vehicle on a public roadway in Bee Cave, Texas in the right lane and preparing to make a lawful right turn.

10.At the same time, B.M., while operating a Nissan Frontier work truck owned, provided, and/or controlled by CertaPro, and while acting within the course and scope of his employment, was traveling in a lane adjacent to Plaintiff.

11.The Nissan Frontier pickup operated by B.M. was a company vehicle used in the course of CertaPro’s business operations, including transportation between job sites and performance of residential project management duties.

12.While traveling adjacent to Plaintiff, B.M. abruptly accelerated the truck, cut into Plaintiff’s lane, and engaged in aggressive and hostile driving behavior, including braking in front of Plaintiff in a manner that created an immediate hazard.

13.In an effort to avoid a collision, Plaintiff changed lanes and rolled down his window, asking B.M. what he was doing. B.M. responded with an aggressive hand gesture and continued driving in the right lane, now parallel to Plaintiff, in a manner seemingly intended to intimidate and/or interfere with Plaintiff’s lawful movement.

14.As Plaintiff attempted to safely return to his originating right lane to complete his intended turn, B.M. re-accelerated the truck in an apparent attempt to block Plaintiff’s lane entry.

15.B.M. then struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing Plaintiff to spin out of control. B.M. immediately struck Plaintiff’s vehicle a second time, causing a second violent rotation across multiple lanes of traffic, and ultimately forcing Plaintiff’s vehicle into the median where it came to rest facing the opposite direction of travel and oncoming traffic.

16.As a direct and proximate result of B.M.’s conduct, Plaintiff suffered bodily injuries and incurred physical pain, mental anguish, and accompanying property damage.

17.Based upon information and belief, J.B. is the lawful owner, presidential officer, and/or controlling decision-maker of CertaPro and its business operations, and B.M., at all relevant times, was employed by CertaPro as a residential project manager and was acting within the course and scope of his employment.

18.This suit is brought in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas for the recovery of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants herein. Plaintiff will show that the incident, and accompanying injuries, occurred and was proximately caused by the negligence of Defendants. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend and/or supplement this petition as facts, discovery, and circumstances may dictate.

V. Causes of Action — Count One: Negligence (Against B.M. Only)

19.Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

20.At the time and on the occasion in question, B.M. committed acts and omissions, which collectively and separately constituted negligence. B.M. owed Plaintiff a duty to exercise ordinary care, meaning such degree of care that would be used by any individual of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

21.B.M. breached that duty in one or more of the following, non-exclusive ways: (a) In failing to operate his vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner for the traffic and roadway conditions present; (b) In failing to safely maintain a proper lookout and/or his lane of travel; (c) In failing to maintain proper control of his vehicle and/or interfering with Plaintiff’s lawful lane position; (d) In engaging in aggressive driving behavior and escalating a routine traffic interaction into a hazardous roadway confrontation; (e) In accelerating and operating his vehicle in a manner intended to block or prevent Plaintiff from safely returning to his proper lane of travel; and (f) In striking Plaintiff’s vehicle on two separate occasions, causing Plaintiff’s vehicle to lose control, spin across multiple lanes of traffic, and ultimately come to rest in the median facing the opposite direction of travel.

22.B.M.’s negligence, either singularly or in combination, was a proximate cause of the collision and resulting injuries and damages to Plaintiff.

Count Two: Negligence Per Se (Against B.M. Only)

23.Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

24.B.M.’s acts and omissions also constitute negligence per se because he violated statutes enacted for the protection of the motoring public, including Plaintiff, and the harm suffered is the type of harm those statutes were designed to prevent.

25.B.M. violated the following statutes enacted for the protection of the motoring public, including Plaintiff, in one or more of the following, non-exclusive ways: (a) In violating Tex. Trans. Code § 545.060 by failing to maintain a single lane and operating his vehicle in a manner that moved into and interfered with Plaintiff’s lawful lane of travel in an unsafe manner; (b) In violating Tex. Trans. Code § 545.062 by operating his vehicle in an unsafe manner relative to traffic conditions, including accelerating in close proximity to Plaintiff’s vehicle to prevent safe lane movement; (c) In violating Tex. Trans. Code § 545.351 by operating his vehicle at a speed and in a manner not reasonable and prudent, including accelerating during an active lane change and collision avoidance situation; and (d) In violating Tex. Trans. Code § 545.401 by operating his vehicle in a reckless manner, including aggressive driving behavior, intentional blockage of Plaintiff’s movement, and conduct demonstrating willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others.

26.B.M.’s conduct occurred in the immediate sequence of events leading to the collision and directly contributed to the loss of control of Plaintiff’s vehicle, multiple impacts, and resulting spin across multiple lanes of travel.

27.B.M.’s statutory violations were not merely technical violations but affirmative acts of unsafe driving that created the precise type of roadway danger the Texas Transportation Code is designed to prevent. B.M.’s statutory violations constitute negligence per se and establish breach of duty as a matter of law.

28.B.M.’s violations of these statutes were a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. Such damages were the foreseeable result of B.M.’s statutory violations.

Count Three: Vicarious Liability (Against CertaPro Only)

29.Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

30.At all relevant times, B.M. was an employee of CertaPro acting within the scope and course of his employment and duties. B.M. was assigned duties as a residential project manager and was authorized to operate a company-owned or controlled motor vehicle, including the Nissan Frontier work truck, in furtherance of CertaPro’s business operations.

31.At the time of the incident, B.M. was operating a vehicle owned or controlled by CertaPro while performing job-related duties, including transportation and activities in furtherance of CertaPro’s residential project management operations. B.M.’s operation of the vehicle occurred during the time period in which he was engaged in employment-related travel and activities benefiting CertaPro.

32.B.M.’s negligent operation of the vehicle, as described herein, occurred within the course and scope of his employment. Thus, CertaPro is vicariously liable for the negligence of B.M. under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as an employer is liable for negligent acts and omissions of its employee when occurring within the course and scope of employment.

33.Alternatively, even if B.M.’s conduct is characterized as improper or unsafe, such conduct arose out of and occurred during the performance of his assigned employment duties involving operation of a company vehicle on public roadways. The risks associated with employee operation of motor vehicles in the course of employment, including unsafe driving conduct, lane interference, and collision-causing behavior, are foreseeable incidents of the employment relationship and fall within the scope of employer responsibility.

34.As a direct and proximate result of B.M.’s negligence, for which CertaPro is vicariously liable, Plaintiff suffered injuries and damages.

Count Four: Negligence (Against CertaPro and J.B. Only)

35.Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

36.CertaPro, and J.B. in his role as the lawful owner, presidential officer, and/or controlling decision-maker of CertaPro and its business operations, each owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the hiring, training, supervision, retention, oversight, authorization, control, and management of employees who were permitted to operate motor vehicles in the course and scope of their employment in furtherance of CertaPro’s business activities.

37.CertaPro and J.B. each also owed a duty to implement and enforce reasonable safety policies, oversight mechanisms, and operational controls regarding employee operation of company-owned or company-controlled vehicles, including its Nissan Frontier.

38.These duties arose from the reasonably foreseeable risk employees operating motor vehicles in furtherance of business operations may cause serious harm to members of the traveling public if not properly trained, supervised, and controlled.

39.CertaPro and J.B. each respectively breached such duties in one or more of the following, non-exclusive ways: (a) In failing to exercise reasonable care in the selection, supervision, and oversight of employees authorized to operate company vehicles; (b) In failing to implement, enforce, or maintain reasonable safety oversight, supervision, and operational controls for employee use of company vehicles; (c) In failing to implement reasonable safeguards and adequate driver safety protocols, oversight systems, or corrective procedures to prevent unsafe or aggressive driving behavior by employees operating vehicles on public roadways in the course of employment; and (d) In failing to adequately monitor, supervise, or regulate B.M.’s operation of a company vehicle while performing job-related duties.

40.CertaPro and J.B.’s failure to implement and enforce reasonable safety oversight, supervision, and operational controls allowed unsafe operational practices to exist, creating an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the traveling public, including Plaintiff, that employees, including B.M., would engage in unsafe, aggressive, or reckless driving on public roadways.

41.The negligent acts and omissions of CertaPro and J.B., individually and collectively, and singularly or in combination, permitted and contributed to B.M.’s unsafe operation of a company vehicle and were a proximate cause of the collision involving Plaintiff and his resulting injuries and damages.

Count Five: Gross Negligence (Against B.M. Only)

42.Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

43.The acts and omissions of B.M., viewed objectively from his standpoint at the time of the occurrence, involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others, including Plaintiff and the traveling public. More specifically, B.M.’s conduct created an extreme risk of serious bodily injury or death because aggressive roadway interference, intentional lane blocking, acceleration during an active traffic conflict, and repeated vehicle impacts foreseeably risk loss of vehicle control, multi-vehicle collisions, secondary impacts, and catastrophic roadway events.

44.B.M. engaged in aggressive and reckless driving behavior while operating a motor vehicle on a public roadway, including accelerating to interfere with Plaintiff’s lawful lane movement, intentionally preventing Plaintiff from safely returning to his lane of travel, and striking Plaintiff’s vehicle multiple times during the same sequence of events. After the initial impact caused Plaintiff to lose control and spin across multiple lanes of traffic, B.M. struck Plaintiff’s vehicle a second time, further increasing the likelihood of catastrophic injury or death.

45.At the time of the occurrence, B.M. had actual and subjective awareness of the extreme risks associated with his conduct because a reasonable driver necessarily understands that intentionally interfering with another vehicle’s movement and engaging in repeated collision-causing conduct on an active roadway creates a high probability of serious harm.

46.Despite such awareness, B.M. nevertheless proceeded with a conscious indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of Plaintiff and others by continuing to aggressively operate the company vehicle in a dangerous and collision-causing manner.

47.B.M.’s gross negligence was a proximate cause of the collision involving Plaintiff and his resulting injuries and damages.

48.As a direct and proximate result of B.M.’s gross negligence, Plaintiff seeks recovery of exemplary damages pursuant to Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.

VI. Damages

49.As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ above-stated actions and/or inactions, Plaintiff brings this lawsuit for the following damages: (a) Past and future physical pain and suffering; (b) Past and future physical impairment; (c) Past and future mental anguish; (d) Past and future medical and other healthcare-related expenses including, but not limited to, those associated with medical treatment, rehabilitation, therapy, diagnostic testing, prescriptions, and follow-up care; (e) Past and future lost wages and loss of earning capacity; (f) Past and future loss of enjoyment of life; (g) Punitive and exemplary damages; (h) Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and all associated court costs and fees in accordance with Section 304.104 of the Texas Finance Code; and (i) Any and all other damages, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.

VII. Preservation of Evidence

50.Defendants are hereby placed on notice to preserve all evidence relevant to the incident forming the basis of this lawsuit, including but not limited to: (a) Any dash camera footage, surveillance video, traffic camera footage, business surveillance footage, photographs, recordings, or other video evidence depicting the roadway, surrounding traffic conditions, vehicles involved, or the collision sequence for the date of the incident, including footage from several hours before and after the occurrence; (b) Any onboard vehicle data, electronic control module (“ECM”) data, event data recorder (“EDR”) data, global positioning system (“GPS”) data, telematics data, speed data, braking data, acceleration data, location history, cell phone data, or electronically stored information from the Nissan Frontier operated by B.M. on the day of the incident; (c) Incident reports, internal reports, employee statements, witness statements, insurance communications, and any communications concerning the collision or B.M.’s operation of the vehicle the day of the incident; (d) Employment records, driver qualification records, disciplinary records, personnel files, training records, supervision records, performance evaluations, and any complaints, reports, or documentation relating to B.M.’s driving conduct or operation of company vehicles; (e) Policies, procedures, manuals, training materials, safety protocols, fleet management records, and operational guidelines regarding employee vehicle use, roadway safety, distracted driving, aggressive driving, and operation of company-owned or company-controlled vehicles; (f) Vehicle maintenance records, inspection records, repair records, ownership records, assignment records, and usage logs relating to the Nissan Frontier involved in the incident; (g) Any photographs, videos, text messages, emails, social media, electronically stored information, or other communications relating to the incident, roadway interaction, Plaintiff, B.M., or operation of the vehicles; and (h) Any other tangible evidence or electronically stored information relevant to Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’ defenses.

51.Defendants are further notified that the destruction, alteration, loss, failure to preserve, or spoliation of relevant evidence may give rise to all remedies and presumptions available under Texas law.

VIII. Jury Demand

52.Pursuant to Rule 216 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff requests a trial by jury as to all triable issues in this cause of action, tendering the required fee accordingly.

IX. Reservation of Rights

53.Plaintiff is presently unable to fully identify, without the benefit of discovery, all persons or entities who may be responsible for the occurrence made the basis of this suit, the precise scope of each Defendant’s involvement, or the complete factual basis for all potential claims, causes of action, damages, and witnesses. Accordingly, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Petition as discovery progresses to add, substitute, or dismiss parties as may be appropriate, and to assert additional or different claims, allegations, causes of action, and theories of recovery as the facts and evidence may warrant.

X. Request for Disclosure

54.Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2, Defendants are requested to disclose all information and materials required by Rule 194.2 within the time prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

XI. Notice Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.7

55.Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7, Defendants are hereby placed on actual notice that any documents produced in response to written discovery, produced for inspection at deposition, or otherwise produced in this litigation may be used by Plaintiff in any pretrial proceeding and/or at trial.

56.All documents produced by Defendants in this litigation shall be deemed authentic for use against Defendants unless, within the time prescribed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7, Defendants serve written objections stating the specific basis for any challenge to authenticity.

Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff M.A. prays to recover such sums against Defendants as would reasonably and justly compensate him, in accordance with the rules of law and procedure, as to actual and exemplary damages, together with costs of court, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law, and for any other and further relief, either at law or in equity, to which he may be justly entitled.

Dated: May 21, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

JDA Trials LLC

/s/ Jeffrey D. Anderson

Jeffrey D. Anderson

State Bar No. 24087100

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Redacted public copy prepared by JDA Trials · Allegations are not findings · Not legal advice